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CUBA'S NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
NUMBER 118: CAN TAX INCENTIVES
BuY FOREIGN INVESTORS' TRUST AND
BE JUSTIFIED IN INCREASING FDI?
Alyssa K. Ortiz*
I. INTRODUCTION
OREIGN Direct Investment (FDI) is recognized as a crucial as-
pect of modern countries' economic development. An increasing
amount of governments are incorporating a FDI policy into their
law to attract investors and promote their land as an attractive place for
capital.' The countries where FDI thrive are those that work toward cre-
ating a safe, convenient, and liberal investment structure and climate.2 In
an ever-competing international economy, incentives are key for at-
tracting investors-second to primary determinants like market size, re-
source availability and access, and employment skills. 3 Possibly the most
common incentives are financially driven and deal specifically with tax
rate reductions or exemptions for a particular sector of business or type
of tax.4 Successful tax incentives to FDI should produce a win-win out-
come-investors receive a financial break, while the host country's capi-
tal growth and intangible assets increase. 5
Cuba, a country many understand to be in economic flux and in need
of capital, has benefited from its utilization of an FDI regime. The most
recent reform to its foreign investment policy, Law Number 118 (Law
118), is noted primarily for its charming tax reductions and exemptions.
Cuba anticipates this law will increase FDI to about $2.5 billion per year.
However, in light of the insecurity Cuba has instilled in investors, the
reality of this estimate is questionable.
*Alyssa is a J.D. Candidate, May 2016, at SMU Dedman School of Law and has a
B.A. from the University of Georgia. She would like to thank her family and
friends for their unconditional support, encouragement, and love, as well as ac-
knowledge that all success be to the glory of God.
1. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 6-8,
2002, The Development Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives,




4. Id. at 30.
5. Email interview with Cuban Attorney, (Nov. 8, 2014). Attorney did not want to be
named.
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This article conducts a brief history of the relationship between the Cu-
ban government and foreign investors. It then lays out Law 118's
changed tax provision as compared to Law 77 (Cuba's prior foreign in-
vestment law), analyzing the tax incentives' potential success to FDI in-
crease, while keeping in mind the country's social and political structure.
Finally, it sets forth a brief comparative analysis between what the law
says on paper and what is evidenced in practice.
II. CUBA'S HISTORY WITH FOREIGN BUSINESS AND
FOREIGN INVESTORS
"A reputation once broken may possibly be repaired, but the world will
always keep their eyes on the spot where the crack was." 6
-Joseph Hall
The weariness and mistrust causing many foreign investors' hesitation
is far from unmerited. Foreign investors have been unexplainably ar-
rested and their investments taken without indemnification. For instance,
a septuagenarian Canadian auto executive was sentenced to fifteen years
in prison for what the state claims to be corruption-related charges. 7 The
foreign company contends this allegation is unsupported and describes it
as a fabrication by the Cuban government to confiscate the company's
$100 million in assets in Cuba. 8 Governmental takings, such as this, have
largely characterized Cuba's interaction with investors for the past half-
century.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Cuba was under a time of change, all
starting with and driven by the Revolution. Under Castro's regime, the
government's economic and commerce power spread contagiously
throughout the island. His unchecked and unbalanced power over every
aspect of government opened the door to future decades of infamous ten-
sion and doubts in loyalty between Cuba and foreign investors across the
world.9
In 1959, at the beginning of the Revolution, Cuba had no foreign in-
vestment law in place. Despite this, the United States, along with many
other western nations, engaged in relatively amicable business relations
with the island. But once the Revolution began, Cuba refused to ac-
knowledge negotiations with the United States, and by 1963, it absolved
all of the U.S. operations in Cuba. 10 As a result, the United States ceased
6. Joseph Hall Quotes, BRAINY QuoTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/
josephhall126495.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
7. Michael Weissenstein, Cuba gives prison term to Canadian executive, SARASOTA
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 28, 2014, at A16.
8. Id.
9. ERIC N. BAKLANOFF, EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. INVESTMENIS IN CUBA, MEXICO,
AND CHILE 117 (1975).
10. JAIME SUCIILICKI yT AL., CUBA, A COUNTRY STUDY 68 - 70 (Rex A. Hudson, 4th
ed. 2002), available at http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CS-Cuba.pdf; see also
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 88TII CONG., EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN-
OWNED PROP. BY FOREIGN GOVERNME7NTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16 - 19
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importing sugar from Cuba and started its notorious embargo in October
of that year." The year 1961 hosted the Bay of Pigs and complete sever-
ance of U.S. diplomatic ties with Cuba.12 By 1964, after observing Cas-
tro's disallegiance with the United States, and experiencing
expropriations themselves, Spain, France, other investing nations, and all
nations of the Organization of American States (with the exception of
Mexico) ended diplomatic and business relations with Cuba.1 3
These uncompensated takings were numerous, tolling to about 5,911
claims and amounting to about $1.8 billion in lost assets in the United
States alone. 1 4 Other nations, including France, Canada, Switzerland,
and Spanish nationals experienced similar expropriation-losses ranged
from about $100 million to $350 million each.1 5
Although Cuba isolated itself from much of the West, it quickly
adopted the Soviet Union as its benefactor. By 1978, and accumulating
through the decade, Cuba's dependency on the Soviet Union teetered on
the verge of excessive; 68 percent of its trade depended on the Soviet
Union.16 The two countries shared a common bond that continued to
disturb international relations-both leaders had a strong revolutionary
goal in the Americas.' 7 This relationship led the Soviet Union to forgive
massive Cuban debt accumulations equivalent to over one million U.S.
dollars per day.' 8 But even with this financial grace, Cuba's economy was
(Comm. Print 1963) (Prepared by Ellen C. Collier) [hereinafter COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS], available at http://www.devkrishan.com/resources/USExpropria
tionPolicy/OE-House-of-Rep-Report-on-Expropriation-of-US-business- 9-J ul-1963
.pdf (explaining the Cuban government's sequential takings after the Revolution
started). Land and buildings of United States citizen were being seized and occu-
pied without court orders in various industries including banking, agrarian, oil,
sugar, and nickel plants. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIPs, supra note 10, at 16. Cuba
passed a law in 1960 authorizing the nationalization of U.S. owned properties. Id.
at 17. The United States, lead by President Eisenhower, protested this law as be-
ing discriminatory, arbitrary, and unjust. Id. By 1963, after Cuba had formed
strong bonds with the Soviet Union and expropriations continued, the United
States froze all assets in Cuba. See id. 17-19.
11. SUCHLICKI ET AL., supra note 10, at 68-70.
12. JFK in History: The Bay of Pigs, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRIDsIuIINriAi LII3,. AND
MusE UM http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Bay-of-Pigs.aspx (last
visited Nov. 7, 2014).
13. BAKLANOFF, supra note 9, at 119.
14. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETI'LEMENT COMM'N OF THE U.S., SECION I1: FINAl, RiPORT
OFt THE CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM UNDER TITLE V OF THE INTERNATIONAI
CLAIMS SI ITLEIMENT Acr OF 1949 412 (1972), available at http://www.justice.gov/
sitesldefaultlfiles/fcscdocsfinal-report-cuba-1972.pdf.
15. Michael W. Gordon, The Settlement of Claims for Expropriated Foreign Private
Property Between Cuba and Foreign Nations Other than the United States, 5 LAW.
AM. 457, 458-60 (1973).
16. See William Leogrande & Julie Thomas, Cuba's Quest for Economic Indepen-
dence, 34 J. LATIN AM. STruDY, 325, 333 (2002). Because of its protection by the
Soviet Union, Cuba was secure from catastrophic oil crisis in the 1970s.' Id. This
stability in cheap oil dissuaded Cuba to trade with other countries, diversify its
exports, or develop its energy-efficient production; these weaknesses first become
apparent in the 1990s when Soviet Union support fails. Id.
17. BAKLANOFF, supra note 9, at 122.
18. See id. at 120; See generally Leogrande & Thomas, supra note 16, at 342 (discussing
Soviet Union aid accumulated to about 65 billion dollars between 1960 to 1990).
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in need of further financial stimulation.' 9
This prompted the 1982 Cuban enactment of The Legislative Decree
Number 50 on Economic Associations between Cuba and Foreign Enti-
ties (1982 Law), the purpose of which was to expand foreign relations and
tourism. 20 The 1982 Law was Cuba's first foreign investment law. But
about seven years later, the effectiveness of this decree proved to be un-
sustainable when the Soviet Union ended its monetary support to Cuba,
throwing the island into a severe economic depression and on a desperate
search for foreign investment to replace its lost support.2 1 In response to
economic crisis, Cuba saw a budding resolution in another foreign invest-
ment structure. 22 As a result, in 1995, Foreign Investment Law Number
77 (Law 77), a considerably liberal code, was presented to Cuba's Na-
tional Assembly and passed.
2 3
A. 1995 CUBAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT-LAw NUMBER 77, ITS
EFFECTIVENESS, AND EVENTS LEADING TO THE ENACTMENT
OF LAW 118
Effectuating September 6, 1995, Law 77 brought much-needed new
hope for Cuba's economy after its 1982 foreign investment law proved
insignificant when most needed. This new legislation created more defi-
nite guidelines for investors; something that the 1982 Law lacked. Ac-
cordingly, it was tactically aimed at enhancing the country's capital,
markets, and technology by drawing in foreign investors.
24
Law 77 produced its desired spike in economic investment initially.
The year immediately following its enactment, 1996, Cuba's FDI jumped
from approximately $5,400,000 to $19,270,000.25 In years following, there
was a total of about 540 enterprises established in Cuba by merit of for-
19. See generally Leogrande & Thomas, supra note 16, at 327 - 33 (describing Cuba
beginning to lose economic security and support from the Soviet Union).
20. Jose M. Diaz Mirabal, Cuba: Legislative Decree on Economic Association Between
Cuban and Foreign Entities, 21 INT'L LEGAL MATEiRIALS 1106, 1107 (1982).
21. See Leogrande & Thomas, supra note 16, at 342 - 43 (describing the extent of
Cuba's dependence on Soviet Union). When trade with Cuba nearly disappeared,
Cuba lost its guaranteed market preference given by the Soviet Union; as a direct
result, consumer good scarcity, rise in unemployment, and decreased quality of life
occurred. Id. Cuba was confronted with the worst economic crisis since 1959. Id.
22. Id. at 344.
23. Jorge A. Vargas, Cuba: Foreign Investment Act of 1995, 35 INT)' LEGAL MA-mRI-
AiS 331, 331 (1996).
24. See Ley de Inversi6n Extranjera Ntmero 77 [LIEX] [Foreign Investment Law],
Gaceta Oficial [Official Gazette of the Republic of Cuba], 6 Septiembre de 1995,
pmbl (Cuba) [hereinafter Law 771.
25. Cuba - Foreign Direct Investment, INDEXMUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts
/cuba/foreign-direct-investment (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
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eign investors.26 This number, however, began declining in 2002.27 In
2003 the enterprises with foreign involvement numbered around 342.28
Despite this decline in investors, a surprisingly steady 16.5 percent of
Cuba's total revenue was acquired through projects with foreign inves-
tors.29 During 2005, the FDI jumped from $3,510,000 to $15,600,000, and
shockingly has only increased through the years. 30 In 2011 Cuba's FDI
hit a record $110,000,000.31 These numbers alone, however, do not re-
flect or support Cuba's need to adopt a new foreign investment policy.
Therefore, brief mention of the social and political surroundings will help
explain these times of economic growth.
The economic growth from 2005 to 2011 can be largely attributed to
Cuba's relationship with Venezuela, which replaced tourism as the num-
ber one source of economic growth since 2004.32 Their primary agree-
ment was that Cuba provides medical services in exchange for oil at
indexed prices and long-term financing opportunities. 33 Venezuela put
Cuba back on this relatively stable economic platform, allowing the island
to nearly double its import capacity, initiate investments, and capitalize
on its source of nickel.34 However, similar to its prior relationship with
the Soviet Union, Cuba's dependence on Venezuela may be dangerously
excessive.35 As of Spring 2014, Venezuela's economy began experiencing
severe inflation and political stress. Although Cuba retains support from
China, Russia, and North Korea, its economy depends substantially more
on Venezuela. 36 Because Venezuela is the trunk of economic support to
26. OMAR EVERIL1NY PERIEZ VILI ANUEVA, LA INVERSION EXTRANJELRA DIRIEG-FA EN
CUBA: Evoi UCION Y PERSPI LTIVAS [FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CUBA:
EvoLurION AND PERSPECriVES], 8 (2001). There are issues with Cuban economic
statistics are widely recognized. Official reports are sporadic, there are multiple
year gaps in data collected, official sources are not always in agreement, and the
methodology behind data collection is unclear. Id.
27. Number of Foreign Concerns Doing Business in Cuba Down for 2003, CUBANi F
(Mar. 23, 2003), http://www.cubanet.org/htdocs/CNews/y04/marO4/23e5.htm.
28. Id.; See generally Leogrande & Thomas, supra note 16, at 345 (describing various
sector increases resulting from FDI).
29. Paolo Spadoni, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA: RECENT DiVELOPMENT'S AN!)
Roi i- IN T-HE ECONOMY, 173 (2002).
30. Cuba - Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 25.
31. Id.
32. Cuba's Economy: Military, GLOBALSECURrrY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/mili




36. Patricia Rey Mallen, China and Cuba Skip the Ideology, Let's Talk About Money,
INT'i- Bus. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/china-cuba-
skip-ideology-lets-talk-about-money-i1575560 (explaining that China historically
has backed Cuba for access to Cuba's resources and similar political ideologies).
In a close second to Venezuela, China is a major trading partner for Cuba. Id.; See
also Havana Thanks Russia for Writing off Cuba's Debts to USSR-Raul Castro,
SPUTNIK, (July 12, 2014, 14:04), http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2014-
07_12/Havana-thanks-Russia-for-writing-off-Cubas-debts-to-USSR-Raul-Castro-
0984/ (explaining Russia's continued relations with Cuba and that Russia just
agreed to write off 90 percent of the debt Cuba owed from its prior relations with
the Soviet Union); see also Cuban relations with North Korea: The Cuban Connec-
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Cuba, any shaking of the trunk is inevitably going to threaten, damage, or
destroy the branches. The severity of the inflation for Venezuela's econ-
omy is only a fraction of what Cuba's economy could expect to see if it
loses support from Venezuela, which is not a far-fetched consideration. 37
Despite the late 2000s' profitable FDI increase from Law 77, the qual-
ity of Cuba's economy has drastically declined over the past five years
due to bureaucratic obstacles, instability from Venezuela, and lack of
credibility in the Cuban government. 38 As the island is still trying to re-
cover from its economic pitfall during the Revolution and ward against
possible Venezuelan diminishing support, it is in urgent need of foreign
investment to revive its economy. 39 The government sees the potential
for greater increase if it could accumulate a larger pool of investors. Cuba
is anticipating a $2-2.5 billion FDI increase, which will allow it to reach its
goal of 7 percent growth per year.40 Law 118 may symbolize a fresh start
for Cuba to start winning back its credibility as a safe and financially prof-
itable country for investors to establish investments. But because Law
118 has offered no additional legal securities or guarantees, the tax incen-
tives must be enough to initially entice investors. 41 If Cuba can secure
the trust of weary investors through offering these financial incentives, its
next hurdle is ensuring that the tax incentives can attract enough invest-
ment to make an FDI structure successful, and thus justified.
III. SIGNIFICANT TAXATION CHANGES IN CUBA FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW NUMBER 118
Law 118's stated purpose is to institute a system of services, legal confi-
dence, and assurance of protection to investors in an attempt to attract
investors and increase FDI.42 It outlines Cuba's intention with foreign
investment, noting that it is aimed at promoting diversification and ex-
pansion of export markets, advancing its technologies, obtaining external
financing, creating new jobs, furthering the country's involvement in re-
newable energy and environmental sustainability, and much more.43
Healthcare, education, and military ventures, like in Law 77, remain
tion, ECONOMIST (Dec. 15, 2013, 6:15) http://www.economist.com/blogs/americas-
view/2013/12/cuban-relations-north-korea (explaining Cuba and North Korea work
well together because they share a similar ideology).
37. Silvana Ordonez, Cuba Could Be Venezuela's Biggest Loser, NBC Ntws (Mar. 18,
2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/venezuela-crisis/cuba-could-be-
venezuelas-biggest-loser-n56101.
38. Interview with Cuban Attorney, supra note 5.
39. Id.
40. Kelcey Hadden-Leggett, Cuba Takes Another Step Forward to Join Global Econ-
omy, PANORAMAS (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/content/cuba-
takes-another-step-forward-join-global-economy.
41. See Ley de Inversi6n Extranjera Ntimero 118 [Foreign Investment Law Number
118], Gaceta Oficial de la Republic de Cuba [Official Gazette of the Republic of
Cuba] 29 de Marzo de 2014 (Cuba) available at http://www.cubadiplomatica.cu/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticketdG-CVp5To%3D&tabid=21894.
42. Id. art 1.1.
43. Id. art. 2, 3.
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outside the eligible sectors for foreign investment." These goals and reg-
ulations are almost identical to those of Law 77. 4 5
The discussion below of Law 118 will only address the labor, income,
and profit tax provisions that vary significantly from Law 77, for these
provisions are likely to be the most attractive to foreign investors, and
accordingly, are the areas of interest for this article.
A. MONEY TALKS: THE SPECIAL TAX STRUCTURE
Compared to the other amended provisions in Law 118, the Cuban
government most drastically altered its taxation structure, providing
strong financial incentives to foreign investors. Out of the three general
modalities of investment, only the joint venture and international eco-
nomic association agreement entities are eligible for Law 118's tax incen-
tives; fully foreign capital companies do not qualify.46 Fully foreign
companies are required to pay taxes in accordance with the current tax
legislation and do not receive any exemption or discount benefit from this
new law.4
7
Law 118 reduces the profits tax to 15 percent of the net taxable profit
and exempts the parties from paying the tax for eight years upon signing
the agreement. 48 In addition, it totally eliminates a labor tax imposed for
using the Cuban labor force, as well as income tax.49 Although these
44. Id. art. 11.1.
45. Compare id. art. 1.1, with Vargas, supra note 23, at 344.
46. Ley de lnversi6n Extranjera Ntimero 118 [Foreign Investment Law Number 118],
Gaceta Oficial de la Republic de Cuba [Official Gazette of the Republic of Cuba]
29 de Marzo de 2014, art. 44 (Cuba), available at http://www.cubadiplomatica.cu/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticketdG-CVp5To%3D&tabid=21894. Law 118, like Law 77,
provides three different investment structures: 1) Joint Ventures, 2) International Ec-
onomic Association Contracts, and 3) Totally Foreign Capital Companies. Id. art.
13.1. Joint ventures are defined as a "Cuban commercial company which adopts
the form of a corporation with registered shares in which one or more national
investors and one or more foreign investors participate as shareholders." Id. art.
2(h). An International Economic Association Agreement is "an agreement be-
tween one or more national investors and one or more foreign investors"; each
party imparts its separate contributions, and each party retains ownership of these
separate contributions. Id. art. 2(f), 15.1(d). A Totally Foreign Capital Company
is wholly owned by foreign investors; it is fully funded by foreign capital, meaning
it does not have a national investor. Foreign investors in this venture are allowed
to enjoy all the benefits, rights, and obligations that accompany complete business
ownership. Id. art. 16.1.
47. Id. art. 44.
48. Id. art. 36.1 - 36. 2.
49. Id. art. 39; see generally Michael Weissenstein & Andrea Rodriguez, Cuba Seeks
Over $8 billion in Foreign Investment, ASSOCIATED Piuss (Nov. 3, 2014), http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/9b3318cce5e54331995fa807d7bl 17a3/cuba-seeks-over8-bil
lion-foreign-investment (explaining that foreign executives are required to hire
Cuban employees through the State's labor force agency). This allows the govern-
ment to maintain control over its people by setting wages, managing employee
placement, and handling employee complaints. In select ventures, after approval
from the government, foreign investors are able to hire high-level employees di-
rectly. Investor's complain about this structure because it drastically limited their
ability to select and promote their employees. Wissenstein & Rodriguez, supra
note 49.
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three tax breaks appear inconspicuously embedded in Law 118, they may
amount to sizeable attractions and advance Cuba's FDI.
IV. ANALYSIS OF PROVISIONAL CHANGES FROM LAW 77
TO LAW 118
The varying provisions of Law 118 are an attempt by Castro to expand
Cuba's foreign investment market that has long been limited by the coun-
try's political and economic platform refusing to release control, as well
as its unfavorable reputation in the international perspective.50 The
changes from Law 50 to Law 77 illustrated a sizeable governmental effort
to reduce its power over foreign investors with the first appearance of an
express guarantee protecting against unwarranted and uncompensated
government takings of foreign investments. While Law 118 includes this
guarantee, there are no further amendments of security-the warranty
provision from Law 77 to Law 118 reads verbatim the same. 51
Therefore, the government's expectation for success depends primarily
on the tax incentives to Law 118. The presupposition to an successful
FDI tax incentive is that the country ultimately benefits from the invest-
ment more than the investor.52 An FDI should seep into the expansion
of the country's intangible resources, such as indirect technological ad-
vancements and expansion of workers' skills.53 Thus, while these tax re-
ductions and exemptions facially seem to benefit the investor more, a
successful FDI is dependent on the offset of decreased governmental rev-
enues from the incentive that flows into the utilization of intangible areas
resulting in the increased tax revenues flowing from the investment. 54
The varying tax incentives from Law 77 to Law 118 need to not only be
enough to subside investors' fear of expropriation, but, in order for it to
be justified, they also must induce investors who will introduce and ad-
vance these intangible benefits in other sectors, not just increase capital
flow. If this occurs, the government's decreased tax revenue from the tax
deductions will be offset by the inadvertent intangible benefits flowing
into other sectors. Below, the labor tax exemption, income tax exemp-
tion, and profit tax reduction incentives' probability for success in the
Cuban ambiance are analyzed.
50. DR. OMAR EVFiRLENY PERIEZ VILLANUEVA, CUBA: AN OVERVIEW o1v FOREIGN
DIREC-r INVESTMEN',r 4 (2002), available at http://carleton.ca/economics/wp-content
/uploads/cep02-04.pdf.
51. Compare Ley de Inversi6n Extranjera Ndmero 118 [Foreign Investment Law
Number 118], Gaceta Oficial de la Republic de Cuba [Official Gazette of the Re-
public of Cuba] 29 de Marzo de 2014, ch. III (Cuba) with Vargas, supra note 23, at
346.
52. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., July 2000,
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A. LABOR FORCE TAX
As compared to Law 77, Law 118 eliminates the labor tax requirement
entirely.55 The old law set the tax at an 11 percent rate, with an addi-
tional 14 percent rate for Social Security contributions. 56 Combined, the
tax for foreign investors to use the labor force was 25 percent. 57
The government revoking labor tax is beneficial for investors in agri-
cultural or industrial ventures, which comprise about 36 percent of em-
ployment, but even more so for the tourism sector that employs about 63
percent of those employed. 58 Records from 2014 show Cuba's unemploy-
ment rate at a minuscule 3.2 percent, resulting in employment of about
8,110,000 citizens.5 9 Cuba's tourism industry, multiplying its gross income
eight-fold within the past decade, has grown into one of the most profita-
ble and attractive investment areas in the country. 60
The island's thick culture, rooted in music, architecture, and art, pro-
vides a lens back in time for tourists.6 1 Since the Revolution began, the
cars, buildings, and development seem to have stopped the country's time
clock and preserved the beauty of what once was a glorious time. 62 This
is undoubtedly a significant allure for tourists. The country's tourism,
however, spreads beyond its beaches and group tours through Havana;
health tourism, eco-tourism, sports, and education contribute to the sec-
tor's success as well.6 3 Needless to say, tourism accounts for a large ma-
jority of the country's labor force consumption and economic backing; it
is a promising sector to see the labor tax incentive result in a successful
FDI. 64
A successful tax incentive to FDI will require investments to initiate an
overflow beyond the immediate capital from the hotel, agriculture or in-
dustrial investment and into the intangible benefits of employment, de-
velopment of managerial skills, and contributing to technological, energy,
and medical advancements.
For instance, in order for the tax incentive to be justified, a foreign
investment venture in any branch of Cuba's tourism sector must expose
its employees to managerial skills or expertise, which the employee will
55. Vargas, supra note 23, at 353 - 54.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Cuba: economy, GLOBAi-EDGE, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/cuba/econ
omy (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
59. Id.; 2014 Index of Economic Freedom: Cuba, HERITAGE FOUND., http://
www.heritage.org/index/country/cuba (last visited Apr. 25, 2015); Cuba Population
2014, WORLD POPULATION RiEv., http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/
cuba-population/ (last updated Oct. 19, 2014).
60. Ornaldo Gutierez Castillo & Nelida Gancedo Gaspar, Tourism Development for






64. Leogrande & Thomas, supra note 16, at 349.
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presumably take to his next job, thus spreading the benefits of the initial
investment. And because Cuba's tourism sector utilizes a large portion of
the state's employees, and it is a thriving attraction for foreign invest-
ments, the labor tax exemption to FDI will likely be justified by this sort
of spillover.
If the labor tax exemption incentive proves to effectively increase FDI,
the resulting economical growth would offset the initial decreased tax
revenue for the government. Although the Cuban government has
agreed to take on the burden of supplying social security contributions,
65
the benefit should far outweigh the burden if these intangible skills, train-
ing, exposure to technological advancements, and new knowledge spread
to other sectors and are not simply internalized at the point of immediate
investment. For Cuba to see an offset of this incentive, it must approve
investments with investors who will bring this sort of foreign expertise
into Cuba.
B. INCOME TAX
Foreign investors are exempt from paying income taxes on net profits
of their business under Law 118's Article 35.66 This is a generous attrac-
tion for investors, allowing them to receive all their wage earnings and
dividend returns that would otherwise be reduced by the tax.67 It also
illustrates that the government is willing to release its control and give
investors more privacy concerning their investments and businesses. The
government relieving itself of this power and focus on immediate return
sheds a positive light, possibly revealing its intentions, desires, and efforts
to make Law 118 successful for both itself and investors. This exemption
also indicates the government's confidence in being able to compensate
for the income tax exemption elsewhere, like through the intangible ben-
efits a successful FDI regime generates. In combination with all other
factors an investor considers when making his venture decisions, if the
income tax exemption works as an enticement to bring investment into
Cuba, the initial loss of income tax paid to the government will be far out-
weighed by a future increased economical boost, along with many of
those intangible benefits that could be introduced to the country. If in-
vestors can overcome the insecurity of doing business in Cuba, the ab-
sence of income tax on foreign investors is likely to expedite and multiply
investment in the country, and thus result, or at least raise the probability
for FDI success.
65. John Pike, Cuba's Economy, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/cuba/economy.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
66. Ley de Inversi6n Extranjera Ntimero 118 [Foreign Investment Law Number 118],
Gaceta Oficial de la Republic de Cuba [Official Gazette of the Republic of Cuba]
29 de Marzo de 2014, art. 35 (Cuba).
67. Id.
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C. PROFITS TAX
The new law sets the profits tax of net profits at 15 percent, which is a
50 percent cut from Law 77.68 In addition, Law 118 provides for an initial
eight-year exemption period, a provision not present in the prior law.6 9
Where the old and new merge is with respect to profits from the exploita-
tion of renewable or nonrenewable natural resources. 70 The condition
allows the Council of Ministers to raise the tax as its sees fit, to a cap of
50 percent.7'
Law 118's profits tax decrease and eight-year exemption are unques-
tionably appetizing to foreign investors because a better return on invest-
ment results. But for those investors interested in sectors involving
renewable or nonrenewable natural resources, the proviso put on profits
tax is daunting. There should be great hesitation in the government's
ability to tax up to 50 percent "as it sees fit," as this is an arbitrary and
uncertain measuring method. The provision does not provide an explana-
tion of how the increased rate will be decided. This unchanged ambiguity
in Law 118 will likely not bode well for attracting certain investors.
As unflattering as this provision might be to attracting new investors in
natural resource sectors, it is hardly unexpected. The need for any coun-
try to have a heavier hand in the exploitation of a natural resource is
understood in order to maintain the proper environmental balance of
taking and replenishment. Historically, in the late 1980s and into the
early 1990s, Cuba was globally recognized for its sugar, tobacco, nickel,
coffee, and citrus production. 72 Now, due to a lack of management, inef-
ficient methods, shortage of resources, and various other factors, many of
these resources, with the exception of nickel, have drastically dimin-
ished. 73 As a reference point, Cuba now must import citrus to accommo-
date its tourism demand; its sugar production is declining from 1.6 million
tons compared to a thriving 8 million tons just twenty-five years ago; and
importers refuse to import tobacco after reporting reduced quality.74 The
country's need for managerial skills, organization, technological methods,
and resources in this sector is precisely the sort of intangible benefit that
a tax incentive to FDI should produce. Cuba has unequivocally recog-
nized a flaw in how it governed natural and produced resources in the
past and has drafted its recent foreign investment laws to not only protect
against further depletion, but assist in reviving its resources.
The issue with this income tax provision is not that the government can
increase the rate for renewable and non-renewable resource investors, it
is the ambiguity of how the rate will be set. Further, any sophisticated
68. Id. art. 36.1.
69. Id. art. 36.2
70. Id. art. 36.4.
71. Id.
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73. Pike, supra note 65.
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businessman should know, considering Cuba's history and socialist re-
gime, where there is an ambiguity in an agreement, the government will
prevail. This uncertainty leaves a negative taste in an investor's mouth
because he is unsure whether the tax will be fairly assessed. Cuba may be
asking certain investors to trust in its good-faith dealings prematurely.
V. ON PAPER VS. IN PRACTICE
As stated, Cuba's largest hurdle to overcome is its reputation of taking
successful investments and imprisoning foreign executives without valid
cause. Because of Cuba's communist structure, the government has the
ability to compel investors to relinquish what may, from other countries'
standards, be legally owed by the investor. Although recent expropria-
tions do not amount to the severity of those recorded in the early 1960s,
Cuba's behavior toward investors has been far from a clean slate. The
country's investment law appears attractive on paper, but what happens
in practice illustrates inconsistencies.
On paper, Law 118 (along with Law 77) portrays security and the sense
of a changed Cuban business government. But in practice, doing business
in Cuba remains a risky endeavor. For instance, a British foreign inves-
tor, head of the Coral Capital branch in Havana, was detained abruptly in
the early morning hours for questioning.7 5 His company owned one of
the most exclusive hotels in partnership with the sate.7 6 For months, the
office remained closed and was declared a crime scene.7 7 This past June,
the investors were found guilty of minor charges and released with more
than a year served in prison, but never again saw the millions of dollars
seized by the government. 78
Undoubtedly, the government has an explanation for these occur-
rences. The state defends that its mission, and one of its most resistant
difficulties, is to reduce the corruption that runs rampant. 79 Regardless
of its unsupported reasoning, Cuba continues to use corruption as an ex-
cuse to exile or imprison investors. Within recent years, the government
banned more than 150 businesspeople and dozens of small South Ameri-
can and European businesses.80
Although there may be more to some of these stories than has been
made known to the public, it is, at a minimum, a prime example of the
lack of transparency and trust the Cuban government portrays to its cur-
rent and potential foreign investors.
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It may be a more realistic consideration that these tax incentives will
only produce a successful FDI if Cuba evidences an affirmative attempt
to mend its unfavorable image in the global economy. However, Cuba's
willingness to reach this bar appears questionable. In reality, Cuba has
not only failed to affirmatively provide evidence of reassuring efforts, but
it has swung in the opposite direction by displaying evidence of recent
disparaging treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps some of the changes in Law 118 will be enough to satisfy hesi-
tations of some investors, and Cuba will meet its anticipated growth as a
direct result of Law 118's tax incentives to FDI. But the more likely re-
sult of these amendments will be moderate. On their own, the incentives
to investors would likely be outweighed by introducing the country to
advanced managerial skills and technological methods through invest-
ments in the tourism sector. But the government's continued heavy hand
in successful investments will hamper its potential for securing credibility.
Additionally, Venezuela's economic crisis may force Cuba to rely on
other foreign investors or depend more heavily on China or Russia in
order to prevent the country from an economical crash. If Cuba chooses
the latter, the imprisonment and takings will most likely not subside. If
Cuba decides to deviate from its historical tendency of excessive depen-
dence on select countries, investors may see a turn for the better in
Cuba's treatment and respect for the investments.
Regardless of its reasoning, Cuba cannot expect to substitute guaran-
tees of legal security and protection from expropriation with enticements
of tax breaks without evidence contrary to its harsh history of mistrust.
Unfortunately for Cuba, its recent negative publicity creates an even
stronger precedent of distrust that will inhibit the remarkable potential
the island has for foreign ventures. These financial incentives could help
sway potential investors, but the Cuban government's current unwilling-
ness to liberalize its economic and political structure will have a re-
straining effect on its potential for great success with foreign investment.
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